Taxe environnementale et approche volontaire en oligopole de Cournot
This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (va). The output contraction resulting from the tax amplifies the distortion due to imperfect competition making the tax sub-optimal. The va studied here is a take-it-or-leave-it contract on pollution treatment effort offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. This form of va is only based on end-of-pipe pollution treatment and therefore has a limited effect on output. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the va is more efficient than the tax. It will be satisfied for concentrated industries and for a form of pollution not too harmful and easy to treat. Classification JEL�: D62, H23, L13, L51, Q28.
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