Faut-il un mécanisme fiscal d'assurance dans une union monétaire ?

The existence of asymetrical disturbances can give the idea in a monetary union, to merge the social tranfers systems. This organization which can be named fiscal insurance, is in principle stabilizing, since the country not affected by the shock finances a part of the transfers paid in the other country. However, regionalism (maintaining the national transfers system) permits to avoid that the richer countries, on the average, finance a share of the social transfers decided of in the poorer countries. We build a theoretical model to analyse the components of this choice between fiscal insurance and regionalism of the social transfers system. We show that the monetary policy, normally aiming at stabilizing prices, implemented by the Central Bank of the Union, plays a major role in that choice, and that we are led to take a position not in favor of the insurance mechanism. Classification JEL : E 58 ; E 62 ; E 63