Rôle et statut de l'économiste dans les affaires de concurrence. Leçons tirées de l'histoire américaine de l'industrie cimentière

Economic authors have underlined the deep inroads of economic thinking into competition ( EU ) and antitrust ( US ) policies. Analysing the 70s and 80s, some have gone so far as to refer to this phenomenon as a ?revolution? (Kwoka & White [1989] ; Dumez [1990]). Prima facie, they cannot be dismissed. The economics vocabulary and concepts, even when used as rhetoric (McCloskey [1994]), has pervaded in competition and antitrust literature. The various economic criteria set forward in guidance or consultative documents such as ?greenpapers? in the EU or ?guidelines? in the US is another example. Yet a fair deal of renowned microeconomists remain skeptical. They stress that microeconomics develops according to its own academic agenda, increasingly losing touch with the practicalities of the markets. The academic analytical tools become more and more complex and do not provide with straight answers. But what could really be said about the status of economics in the antitrust decision making process? What can economists claim from their involvement in such matters? To tackle these issues, some distance with the current debates is necessary. Only an historical approach will provide the means to put into perspective the impact of antitrust economic analysis and controversies on the dynamic of markets. Also, concentrating on a particular industry will enable to avoid generalities. The paper selects the cement industry as an empirical material. The focus is made on two important topics in industrial economics: pricing, with the basing point system antitrust case which has arisen in the US in the late 30s and along the 40s (Supreme Court decision, 1948); and industry structure, with the antitrust case on vertical integration which has run along the 60s (?Statement of general policy enforcement?, Federal Trade Commission [1967]). Classification JEL : 031,042,612,634.