Globalisation financière et autonomie de la politique monétaire Le rôle des contrôles de capitaux
This article analyzes the effects of various capital controls on the autonomy of national monetary policy when a country tries to obtain simultaneously real exchange rate stability and price stability. First, we compare, on the basis of their effect on international returns equalization, the Chilean non-remunerated deposit requirement and the Tobin tax. We then analyze their impact on short term exchange rates dynamics in a traditional overshooting model where endogeneous money supply is allowed in order to take into account the possibility of sterilized intervention. Finally, we draw some conclusions on the relative desirability of these two measures on the basis of the theoretical implications of the model and of the Chilean experience of capital restrictions. Classification JEL : F32, F33, G18
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