Incitant salarial, contrôle hiérarchique et comportement productif. Analyse à partir d'un panel cylindré d'entreprises de la branche exploitation forestière du Gabon
The object of the present paper was to arrest the productive behaviour of a panel rolled by companies of the forestry development branch of Gabon to improve the forest policy. To this end, we estimate on one hand, a frontier of production taking into account traditional factors, capital and labor, and on the other managerial incentives salary and hierarchical control and measure the levels of technical inefficiency which ensue for each company. Our results show that the managerial incentives have a positive effect on the production. By reducing inefficiency, they constitute a credible alternative to fiscal policy. JEL Codes: C23, L52, H32
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