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Signaux-prix et équilibre de long terme : reconsidérer les formes d'organisation sur les marchés de l'électricité


  • Dominique Finon
  • Christophe Defeuilley
  • Frédéric Marty


The decentralised electricity market model illustrates several market flaws in the linkage between short-term and long-term decisions. Because of highly specific problems of risk management and market incompleteness, the model does not allow effective allocation of investment in base-load and peak-load capacities leading to an optimal generation system. This makes it necessary to (1) establish regulations to provide a credible basis for remunerating generation capacity, so as to create incentives for investment in peak-load units; (2) accept vertical arrangements enabling operators to share risk with consumers, even if these arrangements constitute market imperfections that will constrain competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Finon & Christophe Defeuilley & Frédéric Marty, 2011. "Signaux-prix et équilibre de long terme : reconsidérer les formes d'organisation sur les marchés de l'électricité," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 81-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_197_0081

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    References listed on IDEAS

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