Étude d'une exception française : les déterminants du choix de la composition du collège de commissaires aux comptes

We examine the determinants of the choice of joint-auditors (zero, one or two Big 4) by French listed companies. This choice is theoretically associated with corporate governance mechanisms. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 175 listed companies from the SBF 250 index and find only weak empirical evidence. Consequently, we partition our sample into more homogenous sub-samples in respect of auditee size. For small and medium companies, family ownership is negatively associated with the selection of at least one Big 4 but not related to the choice of two Big 4. For medium companies, the choice of at least one Big 4 is also associated with other corporate governance mechanisms, either positively (board independence and separation of the roles of chairman and CEO) or negatively (existence of an audit committee). For large companies, the choice is limited to two options (one or two Big 4) and is driven by operational constraints (size and internationalization level of the auditee).