Mouvance réglementaire et jeux de vérité

This paper develops the concept of truth games in the context of ever-changing regulation, which is studied via the social journey of auditor independence prescriptions as comprised in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Our methodological assumption is that any regulation takes position or makes certain claims regarding the object it aims to regulate. In our study, the claim is about specific prohibitions (e.g., the provision of non-audit services to auditees) being warranted in order to strengthen auditor independence. Once officially adopted, regulation and the underlying claims are subject to the influence of rhetorical games, whereby stakeholders seek to influence how the regulation is perceived in the public arena, in the hope of seeing their viewpoint impacting subsequent reforms. Our analysis shows rhetorical games being largely characterized with superficiality. Arguments mobilized in the practitioner communities as well as within regulatory organizations generally consist of general opinions, not supported through convincing elements such as empirical analyses or detailed reflective comments predicated on life experiences. Based on our analysis, we surmise that quite paradoxically, superficiality is one of the main features of « truth » games in a society which is supposed to be on the verge of post-modernity.