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The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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  • Rosa Paolo

    (School of International Studies, 19034 University of Trento , Trento, Italy)

  • Benati Stefano

    (School of International Studies, 19034 University of Trento , Trento, Italy)

Abstract

This article seeks to explain the outbreak of war between Ukraine and Russia in February 2022. The cause of the conflict appears to be very simple: Vladimir Putin wanted to go to war with Kyiv. However, as the bargaining model of war states: a conflict takes at least two actors, both of whom are determined to stop negotiating and resort to arms. We argue here that the negative spiral which led to the outbreak of war can be explained as the outcome of three interrelated strategic games that produced a failure in the US/NATO deterrence posture towards Moscow, an unclear (emboldening?) message sent by the US/NATO to Ukraine, and a misunderstanding of Russia’s war aims (limited vs. unlimited) in Ukraine. A formal model is proposed that explains the outcome of the crisis as the equilibria produced by the interaction of the three actors’ decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosa Paolo & Benati Stefano, 2025. "The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 31(4), pages 409-437.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:31:y:2025:i:4:p:409-437:n:1004
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2025-0039
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    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism

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