Author
Listed:
- Brugali Nicola
(University of Bergamo, Department of Economics, Bergamo, Italy)
- Buonanno Paolo
(University of Bergamo, Department of Economics, Bergamo, Italy)
- Gilli Mario
(Department of Economics, Management, and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy)
Abstract
Why do autocratic regimes have sometimes a weak reaction to terrorism, and conversely why do democratic regimes sometimes react harshly? More generally, what are the determinants of governments’ reaction to terrorism? And, what are the determinants of terrorism and of its dynamic? In the last years, there have been many empirical studies conducted on these questions. We believe, however, that a general theoretical model is missing, which would significantly help empirical research and its interpretation. This paper is a first attempt towards the construction of such a general model. In this model, individual human capital, government responsiveness and economic development are seen as potential factors influencing individual choice to use terrorism as a political strategy. In this paper, we elaborate a strategic model of terrorism with a specific focus on domestic terrorism, in which the individual choice of joining a terrorist organization is a way of pursing specific political aims. This decision is in turn influenced by the interaction between terrorist’ activity, political engagement and government policies. We are able to prove that three different political regimes form the equilibrium outcomes, and that there is not a simple monotonic relationship between a regime accountability and terrorism’ repression. It is then also perfectly possible for a democratic regime to harshly repress terrorism and for an autocratic polity to be tolerant on terrorism.
Suggested Citation
Brugali Nicola & Buonanno Paolo & Gilli Mario, 2017.
"Political Regimes and Government’s Reaction to Terrorism. A Simple Model,"
Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(4), pages 1-11, December.
Handle:
RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:23:y:2017:i:4:p:11:n:6
DOI: 10.1515/peps-2017-0028
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JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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