Oversight of Kenya’s Counterterrorism Measures on Al-Shabaab

Citing comparative US, UK and European jurisprudence, this article proposes a pre-inchoate offence to punish terror suspects at the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. It traces the Kenya government’s twenty-first-century responses to distorted jihad fundamentalism culminating in the current escalating pogroms. Coercive executive counterterrorism responses make exceptions to universal human rights enshrined under liberal democratic constitutions and international instruments. Yet the legality principle constrains the use of pre-inchoate offences. Hence civil society’s resistance delayed the enactment of Kenya’s Prevention of Terrorism Act. Moreover, the Constitutional Court subsequently struck out as ‘vague and ambiguous’ the Security Law (Amendment) Act’s substantive provision which ‘presumed criminal intent for encouraging terror’. Procedurally, another dilemma arises. This concerns whether it is possible for an international terror suspect to have a fair domestic trial. Although ‘limited executive measures’ require some individuals to trade off their own liberties to safeguard the security of others, due diligence can prevent torture or targeted killings. Instead, following Kenyan ‘Operation Linda Nchi’s’ pre-emptive strikes since 2011, Al-Shabaab’s retaliation arguably spiralled into increased violations of the core human right to life. Enacting pre-inchoate offences instead deems Islamist terrorists, particularly secondary offenders, as rational actors. Using a ‘reverse harm thesis’ to justify the education of pre-inchoate offenders, I argue that regional criminal trials of terror suspects constitute better ‘effective oversight’ on human rights violations than executive, legislative or domestic judicial responses. Invoking ‘concurrent responsibility’ to prosecute Al-Shabaab suspects before the ACJHR can therefore facilitate AMISOM’s dignified ‘exit’ strategy from Somalia.