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Contracts and Antitrust Law: a Critique of the Neoclassical View

Listed author(s):
  • Chamoux Jean-Pierre

    (Université de Marne-la-Vallée)

  • Lepage Henri

    (Institut Euro 92)

Registered author(s):

    Il apparaît quen France aujourdhui, le modèle néoclassique de la concurrence inspire l essentiel de la réglementation de la concurrence. Or la théorie économique moderne, telle quelle est inspirée par Coase et Hayek notamment, tend à renverser les certitudes du modèle néoclassique et à admettre que la discrimination commerciale peut avoir un effet bénéfique sur lefficacité économique. La distribution sélective prend tout son sens dans un contexte dincertitude et d information imparfaite. Cest la confrontation de ces deux philosophies celle qui inspire le législateur français, le législateur allemand ou la doctrine communautaire européenne, et celle plus optimiste à légard des pratiques discriminatoires qui est opérée dans cet article. Ainsi, la pratique des prix imposés, la franchise, la concession et la protection territoriale sont analysées dans le cadre de cette confrontation. De même, une critique de la doctrine communautaire est exposée. Lévolution du droit des contrats et du droit de la concurrence fait aussi lobjet dune analyse mettant face à face les deux doctrines. Cest bien la vision du marché en tant que processus qui est au centre de cette analyse.The neoclassical model of competition seems to sustain today in France the main regulations about competition. However, modern economic theory, as initiated by Coase and Hayek notably, calls into question the certainties brought about by the neoclassical model and acknowledges the beneficial effects of commercial efficiency. Contractual discrimination takes its meaning in an open-ended world. The contrast between these two views the one which inspires the French legislator, the German legislator, or the European Community doctrine, and the more optimistic one with respect to discriminatory practices is put forward in this paper. Thus, imposed prices, franchising, concession and territorial protection are pratices discussed within this contrast. Moreover, a critique of the European Community doctrine is developed. The evolution of contract law and antitrust law is also examined by contrasting the two views. It is indeed the thesis of the market as a process which is underlined in the present analysis.

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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 1-17

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:7:y:1996:i:4:n:3
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