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Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities

Author

Listed:
  • Macey Jonathan R

    (Cornell University)

  • Miller Geoffrey P

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Les professeurs Macey et Miller analysent la relation entre l'assurance des dépôts et l' inadé quation dans la structure des échéances des actifs et passifs des banques commerciales. Après avoir critiqué l'hypothèse traditionnelle concernant la réglementation, d'après laquelle les banques sont incitées à financer les actifs à long terme par des passifs à court terme parce que l'assurance des dépôts garantie par l'Etat stimule le crédit des banques et subventionne les passifs à court terme, ils utilisent l'analyse économique des décisions publiques pour soutenir qu'une version modifiée de l'hypothèse de la réglementation est la meilleure explication de la déstructuration des échéances des actifs et passifs bancaires.Finalement, ils considèrent que soutenir l'hypothèse de la réglementation n'entraîne pas l' acceptation du modèle d'assurance des dépôts garantie par l'Etat tel qu'il existe aux Etats-Unis aujourd'hui.Professors Macey and Miller explore the relationship between deposit insurance and the mismatch in the term structure of commercial banks' assets and liabilities. After criticizing the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which posits that banks have incentives to fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities because government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank credit and subsidizes short-term liabilities, they use public choice theory to argue that a modified version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best explanation for the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities. Finally, they argue that embracing the regulatory hypothesis does not imply acceptance of the government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme as it exists in the U.S. today.

Suggested Citation

  • Macey Jonathan R & Miller Geoffrey P, 1995. "Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(4), pages 1-26, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:6:y:1995:i:4:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1208
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