IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Domestic Regulation And International Trade: Where's The Race? - Lessons From Telecommunications And Export Controls

Listed author(s):
  • Cass Ronald A.

    (Boston University)

  • Haring John R.

    (Office of Plans & Policy, Federal Communications Commission)

Registered author(s):

    The debate over international trade has long pitted free trade advocates against those who argue that particular reasons support trade restraints. The newest argument is that open trade leads to a race to the bottom in the regulation of health, safety, welfare, and especially labor and environmental concerns, harming the nations citizens and undermining national sovereignty. One predicate for this argument that trade increases competitive pressure on domestic industry is accurate. That, in turn, will raise the cost of some national policies that otherwise would win (or sustain) political approval. But the remainder of the race to the bottom argument rests on assumptions about regulation, the political process, and trade that do not stand up to examination. While responses to increased international competition will vary, the effects of such competition will generally be consistent with any meaningful notion of sovereignty and also will improve national welfare judged by common economic norms.Le débat sur le commerce international a longtemps opposé les défenseurs du libre échange à ceux qui soutiennent quil existe des raisons particulières en faveur de barrières à léchange. Largument le plus récent est que le libre échange conduit à une course au nivellement par le bas au niveau de la réglementation de la santé, de la sécurité, du bienêtre, et plus particulièrement dans les domaines du travail et de lenvironnement. Selon ses tenants, elle aurait pour conséquence de léser les citoyens de la nation et daffaiblir la souveraineté nationale.Un présupposé de cet argument selon lequel le commerce accroît la pression concurrentielle subie par lindustrie nationale est fondé. A son tour cela entraînera une augmentation du coût de certaines politiques nationales qui auraient par ailleurs obtenu un assentiment politique.Mais le reste de largumentation du nivellement par le bas repose sur des hypothèses à propos de la réglementation, du processus politique, et du commerce qui ne résistent pas à un examen critique.Bien que les réactions à une concurrence internationale accrue varient, les effets dune telle concurrence seront généralement cohérents avec toute notion pertinente de souveraineté et amélioreront le bien-être national tel que jugé par les normes économiques standard.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 1-47

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:1
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.