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Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination

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  • Facchini François

    (Université de Paris 1)

Abstract

Cet article étudie les effets de labsence de prix monétaires sur la coordination des actions individuelles sur le marché politique. Il sarticule autour de deux parties. Il rappelle, dans la première, que le prix monétaire est une condition nécessaire du calcul économique et quil est un pré-requis institutionnel de la coordination des anticipations opérée par lentrepreneur sur le marché. La deuxième partie se cale sur ce résultat. Elle expose, tout dabord, les conséquences sur la formation des préférences politiques de limpossibilité pour les électeurs de pratiquer un calcul monétaire et expl ique, ensui te, comment malgré labsence de prix monétaire, lentrepreneur politique (candidat) ajuste loffre à la demande politique. Nous montrons que la coordination politique se fait autour de lactivité de lentrepreneur politique, mais que le processus de reconnaissance des préférences politiques passe par la prise de parole et la normalisation idéologique du discours politique et non par le système des prix et la normalisation monétaire des préférences économiques. La coordination politique possède, pour cette raison, une moindre efficacité cognitive que la coordination économique.This paper studies the implications of the lack of monetary prices for the modes of individuals calculus coordination on the political market. On the economic market, the evaluation of decision costs is based on monetary prices. The entrepreneurs decisions are led by the profit expectations they build on the information embodied in market prices. Given that there is no price on the political market, how are individuals informed? What are their incentives to act? And how are their actions coordinated? It is argued that 1) the electoral system provides information on the individuals preferences between being candidate and being represented, 2) the individuals are induced to be candidate since the existing political supply does not meet their expectations, and 3) the coordination is achieved through ideology that acts as a signaling mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Facchini François, 2000. "Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-20, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:10:y:2000:i:2:n:5
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