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The Social Security Monopoly in front of the History of the Former Private Social Protection


  • Marques Nicolas

    (Institut d’Etudes Politiques)


Dans la lignée de Kenneth Arrow, les théoriciens du bien-être présentent la mise en oeuvre des programmes publics de Sécurité sociale comme le moyen de pallier les défaillances du marché. Or, cette approche nest pas confortée par une analyse du développement des premières protections sociales. Dune part, les offres privées, loin davoir été défaillantes, se sont développées selon un processus dessais et derreurs leur ayant permis dacquérir un avantage comparatif dans la gestion de lasymétrie de linformation.Dautre part, lintervention publique a entravé le développement de ces protections privées en favorisant la constitution de rentes politiques et financières dès le XIXème siècle. La disparition ultérieure du marché français, loin dêtre une conséquence de ses propres défaillances, apparaît comme la résultante dun phénomène déviction.Following of Kenneth Arrow, Welfare Economics see social security as the only way to solve market failures. This approach is not supported by a careful analysis of the development of the former kinds of private social protections.On the one hand, private institutions, far from being deficient, developed according to a trial and error process, which provided them with a competitive advantage in the management of informational asymmetry.On the other hand, public regulation hampered the development of those first private institutions. Governments favored, as far back as the 19th century, the supply of political and financial rents. The subsequent disappearance of the market, far from being the consequence of its own failures, seems to be the result of a crowding out phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Marques Nicolas, 2000. "The Social Security Monopoly in front of the History of the Former Private Social Protection," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-31, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:10:y:2000:i:2:n:4

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    2. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 116-116.
    3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
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