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Administrative Discretion in U. S. Banking Regulation

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  • Tarullo Daniel K.

    (Nomura Professor International Financial Regulatory Practice, Harvard Law School. The author was a Member of the Federal Reserve Board, and oversight Governor for supervision and regulation, from 2009 until 2017. Cambridge, United States of America)

Abstract

992U.S. banking regulators have considerable discretion in developing and enforcing prudential rules. Regulators have also enjoyed wide discretion in exercising supervisory authority over banks, in order to guard against potential safety and soundness risks that are not covered by the rules. However, recent developments in U.S. administrative law may create some conflict with that broad discretion. Whether or not this conflict comes to pass, a form of judicial review that focuses less on individual supervisory actions, and more on the overall framework within which the supervisory function is carried out, is a more promising way to achieve the administrative law aims of fairness and consistency.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarullo Daniel K., 2022. "Administrative Discretion in U. S. Banking Regulation," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 19(6), pages 992-1009, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:19:y:2022:i:6:p:992-1009:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/ecfr-2022-0024
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