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Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision

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  • Karaivanov Alexander

    () (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Karaivanov Alexander, 2006. "Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-13, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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