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Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players

Author

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  • Hanany Eran

    (Tel Aviv University)

  • Gal Rotem

    (Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

This paper introduces two-player bargaining problems allowing for asymmetric subjective uncertainty about factors that determine whether agreement is achieved, focusing on surprising events, i.e. events believed possible by only one player. A `subjective Nash' solution is proposed, in which a bargaining outcome is defined as immune to all possible appeals given the subjective uncertainty of disagreement. In addition to Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives, the main axiom in the solution characterization is `subjective symmetry'. The solution is shown to be equivalent to a specific, non-symmetric, Nash solution, with preference dependent weights that equal the subjective probability players assign to the intersection of their belief supports.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanany Eran & Gal Rotem, 2007. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:29
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1355
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    Cited by:

    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2015. "On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 624-647.

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