IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v25y2025i1p255-272n1001.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production

Author

Listed:
  • Kim Seongkyun

    (School of Economics, Yonsei University; Korea Insurance Research Institute, 38 Gukjegeumyung-ro 6gil Youngdeungpo-gu, Seoul 07328, South Korea)

  • Shim Myungkyu

    (School of Economics, Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03722, South Korea)

  • Song Doyoung

    (Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr. La Jolla, CA 92093, USA)

Abstract

This paper introduces ex ante information heterogeneity between players into an otherwise standard global game so that both a type with superior private information and that with inferior private information coexist. We first derive the condition under which a unique threshold equilibrium exists. We then show that less-informed (resp. more-informed) players are more likely to attack the regime than more-informed (resp. less-informed) players when (i) the fundamental is perceived to be weak (resp. strong) according to the public signal and (ii) the cost of attack is low (resp. high). We finally derive the implication of our finding on optimal information allocation problem in the context of team production.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Seongkyun & Shim Myungkyu & Song Doyoung, 2025. "EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 25(1), pages 255-272.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:25:y:2025:i:1:p:255-272:n:1001
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0022
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejte-2024-0022?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    global games; unique equilibrium; information heterogeneity; comparative statics; optimal information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:25:y:2025:i:1:p:255-272:n:1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.