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On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Qin Cheng-Zhong

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA)

  • Tan Guofu

    (Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253, USA)

  • Wong Adam C. L.

    (Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong)

Abstract

This paper introduces a family of domains of bargaining problems allowing for non-convexity. For each domain in this family, single-valued bargaining solutions satisfying the Nash axioms are explicitly characterized as solutions of the iterated maximization of Nash products weighted by the row vectors of the associated bargaining weight matrices. This paper also introduces a simple procedure to standardize bargaining weight matrices for each solution into an equivalent triangular bargaining weight matrix, which is simplified and easy to use for applications. Furthermore, the standardized bargaining weight matrix can be recovered from bargaining solutions of simple problems. This recovering result provides an empirical framework for determining the bargaining weights.

Suggested Citation

  • Qin Cheng-Zhong & Tan Guofu & Wong Adam C. L., 2023. "On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 697-721, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:23:y:2023:i:2:p:697-721:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2022-0095
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining problem; non-convexity; Nash product; iterated solution; weight matrix;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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