Targeting Democracies: Regime Type and America’s “Aggressively Unilateral” Trade Policy

Objectives. The American trade policy instrument Section 301 authorizes the president to demand changes in foreign states’ trade policies and to fortify these demands with threats of sanctions. I examine the economic and political factors that influence the selection of states as targets for Section 301 proceedings. Methods. I develop an argument connecting a state’s regime type to the likelihood that it will be targeted under Section 301. Controlling for other relevant factors, democratic states are predicted to have a higher probability of being targeted. I test the hypothesis in a set of regression models on cross–sectional time series data with both targeting incidence and targeting frequency as dependent variables. Results. States with more open and competitive political systems are more likely to be targeted under Section 301. Of the included variables, only a state’s regime type and the size of its trade relationship with the United States have consistently significant effects across alternative model specifications. Conclusions. Section 301 plays on the rivalry between protectionist and export–oriented interests by demanding reductions in trade barriers and backing them up with threats directed against export industries. Industries currently favored by protectionist policies have a higher chance of losing such a political contest in a political system more open to interest–group competition. The institutional form of political competition within a state affects the state’s response to international pressure on trade policy.