Mistrust and Backfire: Information on Government Responsiveness and Tax Compliance in China

Objective: This study investigates how perceptions of government responsiveness influence citizen compliance in authoritarian regimes, specifically examining how exposure to information about reported government responsiveness affects individuals' willingness to pay taxes in China. Methods: A survey experiment randomly assigning prospective Chinese business elites to receive information about increased responsiveness among local congressional delegates was conducted. Tax compliance attitudes were measured using established survey items from the Internal Revenue Service and the World Values Survey. Open‐ended responses and interviews provided qualitative insights into respondents' reactions to the information treatment. Results: Respondents exposed to information about improved government responsiveness demonstrated significantly lower tax compliance than those in the control group. Qualitative evidence revealed that respondents often perceived the positive message as state propaganda inconsistent with their personal experiences, potentially triggering backlash. The negative effect was particularly pronounced among low self‐monitors. Conclusion: Information intended to enhance perceptions of government responsiveness can backfire in authoritarian regimes if perceived as state propaganda inconsistent with lived experiences, reducing citizens' tax compliance. The findings contribute to the literature on the backfire effects of hard propaganda, highlighting how the disconnect between citizens' lived experiences and pro‐regime messaging can undermine policy objectives rather than simply fail to persuade.