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The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting

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  • Aaron Dusso
  • Thomas T. Holyoke
  • Henrik Schatzinger

Abstract

Objective Corporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here. Methods We approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts. Results Our analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards. Conclusion These results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Dusso & Thomas T. Holyoke & Henrik Schatzinger, 2019. "The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1793-1809, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:100:y:2019:i:5:p:1793-1809
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12665
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