A Comparison Of The Effectiveness Of Incentives And Directives: The Case Of Dutch Water Quality Policy
The use of effluent charges as an instrument o f regulatory policy has been the object of much dispute. The controversy between advocates and opponents of replacing directives by incentive strategies in various fields of public intervention has always been rather heated, though carried on more in terms of theory than of empirical evidence drawn from experience with policy instruments in actual operation. Much like permit trading in the United States, regulatory effluent charges in The Netherlands more or less "sneaked in through the back door." The Dutch system o f water quality charges had originally been designed to fulfill solely a revenue-raising function. Copyright 1988 by The Policy Studies Organization.
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Volume (Year): 7 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (03)
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