Author
Listed:
- Stefan Wittwer
- Fritz Sager
Abstract
Public private partnership literature promotes hybrid implementation structures as a potential solution to deal with limited resources and high levels of implementation burden and complexity. Despite the growing relevance and promises of hybrid implementation structures, we lack systematic knowledge on what makes governments opt for the establishment of this type of implementation structure. We modify Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) seminal model of effective implementation to examine the determinants of policy compliance in the case of a distributive Swiss federal policy that aims at incentivizing hybrid service delivery in its subnational units, that is, the cantons. The Swiss New Regional Policy (NRP) disburses funds to foster peripheral regions and sets the output goal for the cantons to involve private actors as project managers. Analyzing a dataset of 977 implemented NRP projects at the cantonal level using Bayesian logistic multi‐level models, we find that opting for hybrid structures in implementation is not only (1) influenced by the willingness of the cantons to comply with the overall goals of the policy but (2) also by project costs and the amount of financial and personnel resources the cantons possess. This latter insight implies that hybrid implementation structures can be a valid alternative for traditional forms of implementation when governments do not have enough capacities to set up and run regional projects without the help of private actors. 公私合作(PPP)文献提倡采用混合实施结构,将其作为应对资源有限、实施负担沉重且复杂程度高的潜在解决方案。尽管混合实施结构的重要性日益凸显,前景广阔,但我们仍然缺乏系统性的知识来解释政府为何选择建立此类实施结构。本文对Sabatier和Mazmanian (1980)的开创性有效实施模型进行改进,以考察瑞士联邦一项旨在激励各州(即地方政府单位)提供混合服务模式的分配性政策的政策执行决定因素。瑞士新区域政策(NRP)拨款扶持边缘地区发展,并设定各州的产出目标,以吸引私营企业担任项目经理。本文运用贝叶斯逻辑多层模型分析了977个已实施NRP项目数据集,发现选择混合实施结构不仅受以下两方面影响:(1)各州遵守政策总体目标的意愿;(2)项目成本以及各州拥有的财政和人力资源。后一项发现表明,当政府缺乏足够的能力在没有私营部门协助的情况下建立和运营区域项目时,混合实施结构可以成为传统实施方式的有效替代方案。 La literatura sobre asociaciones público‐privadas promueve las estructuras de implementación híbridas como una posible solución para abordar la escasez de recursos y la alta complejidad y carga de la implementación. A pesar de la creciente relevancia y las promesas de las estructuras de implementación híbridas, carecemos de conocimiento sistemático sobre qué lleva a los gobiernos a optar por este tipo de estructura. Modificamos el modelo seminal de implementación efectiva de Sabatier y Mazmanian (1980) para examinar los determinantes del cumplimiento de las políticas en el caso de una política federal suiza distributiva que busca incentivar la prestación de servicios híbridos en sus unidades subnacionales, es decir, los cantones. La Nueva Política Regional Suiza (NRP) desembolsa fondos para fomentar las regiones periféricas y establece como objetivo que los cantones involucren a actores privados como gestores de proyectos. Analizando un conjunto de datos de 977 proyectos NRP implementados a nivel cantonal mediante modelos logísticos bayesianos multinivel, encontramos que la elección de estructuras híbridas para la implementación no solo está influenciada por (1) la voluntad de los cantones de cumplir con los objetivos generales de la política, sino también por (2) los costos del proyecto y la cantidad de recursos financieros y humanos de los que disponen los cantones. Esta última conclusión implica que las estructuras de implementación híbridas pueden ser una alternativa válida a la forma tradicional de implementación cuando los gobiernos no cuentan con la capacidad suficiente para establecer y gestionar proyectos regionales sin la ayuda de actores privados.
Suggested Citation
Stefan Wittwer & Fritz Sager, 2026.
"What Makes Member States opt for Hybrid Implementation Structures When the Federal Policy Asks for It?,"
Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 43(3), May.
Handle:
RePEc:bla:revpol:v:43:y:2026:i:3:n:e70097
DOI: 10.1111/ropr.70097
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