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Authority Versus Competition: Intergovernmental Interactions and Subnational Policy Adoption in Climate Policy

Author

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  • Shiming Zheng
  • Alex Jingwei He
  • Yujie He

Abstract

In the face of increasingly complex environmental challenges, subnational governments play a critical role in implementing climate policies. This study investigates how intergovernmental interactions—specifically formal authority interactions and informal competitive interactions—shape the adoption of climate policies by Chinese provincial governments. Drawing on panel data from 31 provinces between 2003 and 2018, the study constructs a two‐dimensional analytical framework to assess how formal authority interactions and informal competitive interactions combine to influence subnational policy adoption. Our findings indicate that formal authority interactions significantly promote provincial policy adoption, while informal competitive interactions follow an inverted “N‐shaped” trajectory characterized by initial suppression, subsequent promotion, and final suppression. Overall, the impact of informal competitive interactions on policy adoption is primarily inhibitory, with limited positive effects emerging during the promotion phase. Informal competitive interactions negatively moderate the influence of formal authority interactions, leading to weakened and distorted positive effects on policy adoption. This study contributes to policy adoption theories by emphasizing the dual roles of power and competition. Moreover, by demonstrating that informal competitions can inhibit the positive effects of formal authoritative interactions on policy adoption, it also enriches scholarly understanding of the dynamics of intergovernmental competition in multilevel governance systems. Ante los desafíos ambientales cada vez más complejos, los gobiernos subnacionales desempeñan un papel fundamental en la implementación de políticas climáticas. Este estudio investiga cómo las interacciones intergubernamentales, en concreto las interacciones entre autoridades formales y las interacciones competitivas informales, influyen en la adopción de políticas climáticas por parte de los gobiernos provinciales chinos. A partir de datos de panel de 31 provincias entre 2003 y 2018, el estudio construye un marco analítico bidimensional para evaluar cómo se combinan las interacciones entre autoridades formales y las interacciones competitivas informales para influir en la adopción de políticas subnacionales. Nuestros hallazgos indican que las interacciones entre autoridades formales promueven significativamente la adopción de políticas provinciales, mientras que las interacciones competitivas informales siguen una trayectoria invertida en forma de “N”, caracterizada por una supresión inicial, una promoción posterior y una supresión final. En general, el impacto de las interacciones competitivas informales en la adopción de políticas es principalmente inhibitorio, con efectos positivos limitados durante la fase de promoción. Las interacciones competitivas informales moderan negativamente la influencia de las interacciones entre autoridades formales, lo que resulta en efectos positivos debilitados y distorsionados en la adopción de políticas. Este estudio contribuye a las teorías de adopción de políticas al destacar la doble función del poder y la competencia. Además, al demostrar que las competencias informales pueden inhibir los efectos positivos de las interacciones autoritarias formales en la adopción de políticas, también enriquece la comprensión académica de la dinámica de la competencia intergubernamental en los sistemas de gobernanza multinivel. 面对日益复杂的环境挑战,地方政府在气候政策的实施中发挥着至关重要的作用。本研究探讨了政府间互动–特别是正式权威互动和非正式竞争互动–如何影响中国省级政府的气候政策采纳。本研究基于2003年至2018年31个省份的面板数据,构建了一个二维分析框架,以评估正式权威互动和非正式竞争互动如何共同影响地方政府政策采纳。研究结果表明,正式权威互动显著促进了省级政策采纳,而非正式竞争互动则呈现出“倒N型”的轨迹,即初始抑制、后续促进和最终抑制。总体而言,非正式竞争互动对政策采纳的影响主要表现为抑制作用,在促进阶段,其正向效应有限。非正式竞争互动负向调节了正式权威互动的影响,导致其对政策采纳的正向效应被削弱和扭曲。本研究强调权力与竞争的双重作用,为政策采纳理论作贡献。此外,通过论证非正式竞争会抑制正式权威互动对政策采纳的积极影响,本研究也丰富了学术界对多层级治理体系中政府间竞争动态的理解。

Suggested Citation

  • Shiming Zheng & Alex Jingwei He & Yujie He, 2026. "Authority Versus Competition: Intergovernmental Interactions and Subnational Policy Adoption in Climate Policy," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 43(3), May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:43:y:2026:i:3:n:e70056
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.70056
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