Author
Listed:
- Qiao Wang
- Jingjing Zeng
- Fang Duan
Abstract
While the “pilot designation” mechanism is recognized for its flexibility and diversity in environmental governance, there remains an unresolved question regarding its optimal implementation. Specifically, the potential for resource redundancy and formalism when an excessive number of projects are initiated has not been thoroughly examined. This study addresses this research gap by conducting an empirical analysis using panel data from 283 cities in China to explore the diminishing marginal returns of the pilot designation system in environmental governance. We examine both the theoretical foundations and practical effects of this policy tool. Our findings indicate that pilot designations initially lead to significant improvements in local environmental governance performance. However, as the number of pilot policies increases, their impact exhibits diminishing marginal returns and can even become negative. Notably, once the number of pilot policies surpasses a certain threshold, the effectiveness of the policy not only stagnates but also declines, suggesting that “more” is not always “better” in the context of policy pilots. Additionally, the success of these pilots is contingent upon the level of attention that local governments devote to environmental governance. These results underscore the necessity for a balanced approach in the design and implementation of policy pilots to avoid overextension and ensure optimal resource allocation. 虽然“试点指定”机制因其在环境治理中的灵活性和多样性而受到认可但关于试点指定的最佳实施却仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。具体而言尚未被全面分析的方面则是过多的项目启动可能带来的资源冗余和形式主义。为填补该研究空白本研究利用中国283个城市的面板数据进行实证分析探讨试点制度在环境治理中的边际效益递减。我们分析了这一政策工具的理论基础和实践效果。研究结果表明试点最初会显著改善地方环境治理绩效。然而随着试点政策数量的增加其影响呈现边际效益递减趋势甚至可能出现负值。值得注意的是一旦试点政策数量超过一定阈值政策的有效性不仅会停滞不前还会下降这表明在政策试点的情境下“更多”并不总是“更好”。此外这些试点项目的成功取决于地方政府对环境治理的关注度。这些结果强调在政策试点的设计和实施过程中必须采取平衡的方法以避免过度扩张并确保最佳的资源分配。 Si bien el mecanismo de designación de pilotos es reconocido por su flexibilidad y diversidad en la gobernanza ambiental, aún existe una incógnita sobre su implementación óptima. En concreto, no se ha examinado a fondo la posibilidad de redundancia de recursos y formalismo cuando se inicia un número excesivo de proyectos. Este estudio aborda esta deficiencia mediante un análisis empírico con datos de panel de 283 ciudades de China para explorar los rendimientos marginales decrecientes del sistema de designación de pilotos en la gobernanza ambiental. Examinamos tanto los fundamentos teóricos como los efectos prácticos de esta herramienta política. Nuestros hallazgos indican que las designaciones de pilotos inicialmente generan mejoras significativas en el desempeño de la gobernanza ambiental local. Sin embargo, a medida que aumenta el número de políticas piloto, su impacto presenta rendimientos marginales decrecientes e incluso puede llegar a ser negativo. Cabe destacar que, una vez que el número de políticas piloto supera cierto umbral, su eficacia no solo se estanca, sino que también disminuye, lo que sugiere que “más” no siempre es “mejor” en el contexto de las políticas piloto. Además, el éxito de estas políticas piloto depende del nivel de atención que los gobiernos locales dediquen a la gobernanza ambiental. Estos resultados subrayan la necesidad de adoptar un enfoque equilibrado en el diseño y la aplicación de políticas piloto para evitar una extensión excesiva y garantizar una asignación óptima de recursos.
Suggested Citation
Qiao Wang & Jingjing Zeng & Fang Duan, 2026.
"When More Isn't Better: The Diminishing Returns of Policy Pilots in Environmental Governance,"
Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 43(2), March.
Handle:
RePEc:bla:revpol:v:43:y:2026:i:2:n:e70029
DOI: 10.1111/ropr.70029
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