IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/revpol/v11y1992i2p37-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations

Author

Listed:
  • James C. Clingermayer
  • William F. West

Abstract

Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures‐legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.

Suggested Citation

  • James C. Clingermayer & William F. West, 1992. "Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 11(2), pages 37-56, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:11:y:1992:i:2:p:37-56
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1992.tb00389.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1992.tb00389.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1992.tb00389.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:11:y:1992:i:2:p:37-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ipsonea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.