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A Theory of Favoritism in an International Oligopoly


  • Ngo Van Long
  • Antoine Soubeyran


This paper offers an explanation of the fact that some foreign firms are favored at the expense of others, and characterizes the distribution of favors in terms of the cost parameters of firms. We present a model where favors must be bought: they come from competing contributions. This model is compared with a benchmark model with a benevolent government. We show how the distribution of favors in the favor‐seeking model deviates from the distribution that would be obtained if the government were really benevolent.

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  • Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2007. "A Theory of Favoritism in an International Oligopoly," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 481-498, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:15:y:2007:i:3:p:481-498
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00629.x

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "A Theory of Favoritism under International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-15, CIRANO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrey Stoyanov, 2014. "Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 561-577, August.

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