Rent Extraction and Political Accountability: Evidence From Audit Impact in Kenya

Political accountability is an anchor to a well‐functioning democracy. Governments and bureaucrats accountable to their electorate abide by the rule of law. With information provision for better governance involving complex conditions, we investigate at what stage corruption information from public oversight institutions is successful in effecting political accountability. Using publicly released audit information on the newly established county governments in Kenya, outcomes of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that initiate the implementation of audit queries, and a nationally representative survey, we find that individuals interviewed immediately after the release of corruption news perceive their county executives (governor's) to be corrupt and condemn local legislators' performance of oversight role. Also, local legislators with a high number of audit irregularities are less likely to run and win in the next elections. Our findings show that in an emerging democracy and developing country context, a symbiotic relationship between audit institutions and the PAC, as expected in a Westminster system, is needed, for one without the other cannot achieve its mandate.