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Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

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  • David Martimort
  • Jerome Pouyet

Abstract

Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

Suggested Citation

  • David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2026. "Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 57(2), pages 402-419, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:57:y:2026:i:2:p:402-419
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70039
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