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Multi‐Product Monopolist and Information Design

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  • Fanqi Shi
  • Yutong Zhang
  • Litian Chen

Abstract

We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi‐product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit‐maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type‐specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer's value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non‐decreasing differences in quality and type and the threshold type is independent of quality. We also characterize the conditions under which an ex‐ante and non‐discriminatory posted price mechanism is optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Fanqi Shi & Yutong Zhang & Litian Chen, 2026. "Multi‐Product Monopolist and Information Design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 57(1), pages 16-38, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:57:y:2026:i:1:p:16-38
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70033
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