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Moral hazard, hold‐up, and the optimal allocation of control rights

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  • Vijay Yerramilli

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  • Vijay Yerramilli, 2011. "Moral hazard, hold‐up, and the optimal allocation of control rights," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(4), pages 705-728, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:42:y:2011:i:4:p:705-728 DOI: j.1756-2171.2010.00151.x
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    1. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2006. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Chapters,in: European Merger Control, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Klaas J. Beniers, 2004. "On the Composition of Committees," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 353-378, October.
    3. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 183-203.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2002. "Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, pages 311-364.
    6. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 231-265.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    8. Emeric Henry, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1036-1064, July.
    9. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
    10. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 393-421.
    11. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 378-405.
    12. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 629-656.
    13. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 18-32.
    14. Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2004. "Expertise and Bias in Decision Making," MPRA Paper 7251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2007.
    15. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
    16. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 58-71.
    17. Robert Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "Producing and Manipulating Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 185-199, January.
    18. Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January.
    19. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
    20. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:1:p:155-175 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 183-203.
    22. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 378-405.
    23. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1431-1451.
    24. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    25. Leland, Hayne E, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 485-489, December.
    26. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 757-770.
    27. Suurmond, Guido & Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2004. "On the bad reputation of reputational concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 2817-2838.
    28. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
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