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Competition or Cooperation? The Case of Revenue From Traffic Citations

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  • Siân Mughan
  • Akheil Singla

Abstract

Governments often interact in public service provision, sometimes competing for resources and other times cooperating to improve efficiency. In traffic enforcement, state and local agencies share responsibility, which could encourage collaboration. However, because traffic tickets generate revenue, financial incentives may drive competition. We examine whether local ticketing responds strategically to state enforcement. Our findings show that when local governments keep citation revenues, they increase ticketing in response to state enforcement, indicating competition. Conversely, when they don't benefit financially, we observe cooperation, suggesting financial incentives shape intergovernmental enforcement dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Siân Mughan & Akheil Singla, 2025. "Competition or Cooperation? The Case of Revenue From Traffic Citations," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 21-35, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:45:y:2025:i:3:p:21-35
    DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12399
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