IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/manchs/v94y2026i5p497-507.html

Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision

Author

Listed:
  • Daehong Min
  • Doojin Ryu

Abstract

We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity. Considering players with heterogeneous wealth levels and valuations of the public good, our first model suggests multiple equilibria at which institution formation is successful. Formation requires each member's valuation to exceed a threshold linked to her contribution ratio. Correlations between valuations and wealth levels influence the equilibrium set's size. Our second model examines sequential decision‐making, uncovering a first‐mover advantage in which non‐members free‐ride on the institution as a second‐order public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Daehong Min & Doojin Ryu, 2026. "Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 94(5), pages 497-507, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:94:y:2026:i:5:p:497-507
    DOI: 10.1111/manc.70042
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70042
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/manc.70042?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:94:y:2026:i:5:p:497-507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/semanuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.