IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/kyklos/v65y2012i1p1-17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm's Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • James Alm
  • Chandler McClellan

Abstract

Much recent research has investigated whether values, social norms, and attitudes differ across countries and whether these differences have measurable effects on economic behavior. One area in which such studies are particularly relevant is tax compliance, and a factor that has been suggested as a factor in compliance behavior is "tax morale", or the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. However, all of this work on tax morale has focused on individuals, not on firms. In this paper, we use information from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey and also from the World Enterprise Survey for a wide range of countries over several years of data to examine a firm's tax morale and the subsequent impact on firm tax compliance. We use these data first to examine a firm's perception of taxes as an obstacle to doing business. Importantly, once we control for the various factors that affect this perception, what is left is a measure that we believe is a measure of the firm's tax morale, as a driver of the firm's view of the appropriateness of cheating on taxes. With this measure of tax morale, we are then able to examine in a second stage estimation how our estimated firm tax morale affects the compliance decisions of the firm. Ultimately, our results allow us to identify factors that allow the government to improve its efforts to increase firm tax compliance.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • James Alm & Chandler McClellan, 2012. "Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm's Perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-17, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:65:y:2012:i:1:p:1-17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nipoli Kamdar, 1997. "Corporate income tax compliance: A time series analysis," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 37-49, March.
    2. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, pages 443-470.
    3. Eliza Ahmed & Valerie Braithwaite, 2004. "When Tax Collectors Become Collectors for Child Support and Student Loans: Jeopardizing the Revenue Base?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 303-326, August.
    4. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742, March.
    5. David Joulfaian, 2000. "Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(4), pages 698-701, November.
    6. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    7. Feld, Lars P & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 197-222.
    8. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
    9. Bosco, Luigi & Mittone, Luigi, 1997. "Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: Some Experimental Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 297-324.
    10. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H & Schulze, William D, 1999. "Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 141-171.
    11. Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
    12. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
    13. Goerke, Laszlo & Runkel, Marco, 2006. "Profit Tax Evasion Under Oligopoly With Endogenous Market Structure," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 59(4), pages 851-857, December.
    14. Alm, James & Jackson, Betty R. & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-303, December.
    15. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
    16. Benno Torgler, 2007. "Tax Compliance and Tax Morale," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4096, April.
    17. Marrelli, M. & Martina, R., 1988. "Tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 55-69, October.
    18. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
    19. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 341-354.
    20. Ingrid Wahl & Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2010. "The Impact of Voting on Tax Payments," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 144-158, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexandru Theodoru DRONCA, 2016. "The influence of fiscal freedom, government effectiveness and human development index on tax evasion in the European Union," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(609), W), pages 5-18, Winter.
    2. James Alm, 2017. "Is Economics Useful for Public Policy?," Working Papers 1702, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    3. Lee,Hyung Chul, 2016. "Can electronic tax invoicing improve tax compliance ? a case study of the Republic of Korea's electronic tax invoicing for value-added tax," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7592, The World Bank.
    4. Thorben C. Kundt & Florian Misch & Birger Nerré, 2017. "Re-assessing the merits of measuring tax evasion through business surveys: an application of the crosswise model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 112-133, February.
    5. Gobena, Lemessa Bayissa & Van Dijke, Marius, 2016. "Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 24-37.
    6. Nichita Ramona-Anca & Batrancea Larissa-Margareta, 2012. "The Implications Of Tax Morale On Tax Compliance Behavior," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 739-744, July.
    7. Ciprian ROTARU & Raluca GEORGESCU & Dumitru-Alexandru BODISLAV, 2017. "The evolution of corruption and its current state – A case study on Romania," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(1(610), S), pages 99-108, Spring.
    8. Katharina Gangl & Benno Torgler & Erich Kirchler & Eva Hofmann, 2013. "Effects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria," QuBE Working Papers 019, QUT Business School.
    9. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    10. Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016. "Corruption and firm tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
    11. Alexandru Theodoru DRONCA, 2016. "The influence of fiscal freedom, government effectiveness and human development index on tax evasion in the European Union," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(609), W), pages 5-18, Winter.
    12. Christoph Kogler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2015. "Testing the “slippery slope framework” among self-employed taxpayers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 125-142, May.
    13. Gangl, Katharina & Torgler, Benno & Kirchler, Erich & Hofmann, Eva, 2014. "Effects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 378-382.
    14. Ciprian ROTARU & Raluca GEORGESCU & Dumitru-Alexandru BODISLAV, 2017. "The evolution of corruption and its current state – A case study on Romania," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(1(610), S), pages 99-108, Spring.
    15. Colin C. Williams & Friedrich Schneider, 2016. "Measuring the Global Shadow Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16551, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:65:y:2012:i:1:p:1-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.