IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Insider Trading


  • Dennert, Jurgen


Most regulations of insider trading rely at least to some extent on fairness considerations. The most prominent legal underpinnings of insider trading legislation are the rule of equality among shareholders, the equal access to information rule and the concept of fiduciary duty. The present paper discusses the main economic arguments concerning insider trading and contrasts them with the different versions of the fairness argument. Three main arguments are analyzed. Does the anticipation of insider trading on secondary markets lead to the breakdown of financial markets? Do the benefits of more informative prices outweigh the costs of information acquisition Does the possibility of insider trading create the right or the wrong incentives for corporate insiders? Copyright 1991 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Suggested Citation

  • Dennert, Jurgen, 1991. "Insider Trading," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 181-202.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:44:y:1991:i:2:p:181-202

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Matthias Helble, 2007. "Is God Good for Trade?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 385-413, August.
    2. Benno Torgler & Nemanja Antić & Uwe Dulleck, 2008. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Is the Happiest of Them All?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 309-319, May.
    3. Andrew W. Horowitz & Julie R. Trivitt, 2007. "Does Child Labor Reduce Youth Crime?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 559-573, November.
    4. M . G. Quibria, 2006. "Does Governance Matter? Yes, No or Maybe: Some Evidence from Developing Asia," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 99-114, February.
    5. Hung-Lin Tao, 2008. "Attractive Physical Appearance vs. Good Academic Characteristics: Which Generates More Earnings?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 114-133, February.
    6. Scott Beaulier & Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Behavioral Economics and Perverse Effects of the Welfare State," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 485-507, November.
    7. John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn & Georgi Tsertsvadze, 2005. "Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 557-573, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Hellwig, 2005. "Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:44:y:1991:i:2:p:181-202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.