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Capitalism Needs Risk‐, not Profit‐Sharing

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  • HERBERT G. GRUBEL

Abstract

The analysis of general risk‐sharing systems shows that profit‐sharing represents a special case of the more general systems. General risk‐sharing systems are more efficient than profit‐sharing systems in that they permit contracting parties to exclude or treat differently certain types of risk, especially those which are endogenous to the firm and its management and therefore subject to moral hazard. Most important, general risk‐sharing systems make it possible to exclude the returns from entrepreneurial risk‐taking from share arrangements with workers. This feature makes general risk‐taking consistent with the efficient operation of dynamic SCHUMPETERian market economies. Risk‐sharing systems can also be used to increase the efficiency of contracts between parties other than employers and employees and they are most likely to raise welfare when one of the contracting parties is the government. Die Untersuchung von allgemeinen Systemen zur Teilung von Risiken zeigt, dass Gewinnteilungssysteme Spezialfälle der allgemeinen Systeme sind. Allgemeine Risikoteilungssysteme sind effizienter als Gewinnteilungssysteme, weil sie den Beteiligten erlauben, alle harten Risiken unterschiedlich zu teilen oder sogar auszuschliessen. Insbesondere solche Risiken, die von innerhalb der Firma stammen, und daher vom Moral‐Hazard‐Phänomen beeinflusst werden können. Besonders wichtig ist, dass allgemeine Systeme zur Teilung von Risiken ermöglichen, Gewinne auszuschliessen, die auf SCHUMPETERische Unternehmungsinitiative zurückzuführen sind. Wird dies getan, ist das Risikoteilungssysten konsistent mit den Eigenschaften dynamischer SCHUMPETERischer Marktwirtschaften. Allgemeine Riskoteilungssysteme können auch die Effizienz von Verträgen erhöhen, die nicht nur Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer betreffen, besonders wenn einer der Vertragspartner die Regierung ist. L'analyse des systèmes de partage du risque montre que le partage du profit n'est pas qu'une version particuliere de ces systèmes. Les systemes de partage du risque sont plus généraux, car ils permettent d'exclure ‐ou de traiter différemment ‐ certains types de risques, spécialement ceux qui sont endogènes à la firme et à son management (et donc sujets à de possibles manipulations unilatérales). Plus important encore, les systèmes de partage du risque rendent possible I'exclusion des résultats provenant d'arrangements particuliers avec les travailleurs. Cette caracteristique rend les systèmes de prise de risque consistant avec le méchanisme de l'èconomie de marché SCHUMPETERienne. Les systèmes de partage du risque peuvent être aussi utilisés pour accroitre I'efficacité des contrats entre des parties autres que les employeurs et les employés, et sont très probablement à même d'augmenter le bien‐être quand une des parties contractantes est le gouvernement.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert G. Grubel, 1987. "Capitalism Needs Risk‐, not Profit‐Sharing," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 163-175, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:40:y:1987:i:2:p:163-175
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb02670.x
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