Rationale Entscheidung, Ungewissheit Und Macht

In this paper on power relations the author assumes that each participant (A, B) behaves rationally, aims at an increase of his utility. The assumption of the purely instrumental character of power constitutes a second important premise: power is supposed to be a means, not an end in itself. When A tries to compel B to do something he wouldn't otherwise have done by threatening retaliation against any disobedience of B, A is interested in the credibility of his threat indeed. However A has usually no incentive actually to carry out the threat in case of resistance by B. Moreover the realization of the threat very often causes considerable costs to the power‐holder. Because of A's dilemma B stands a good chance of resisting the pretension of A without being punished. Finally the author analyses what counter‐moves A can make. In another form of influence—often called ‘manipulation’—B doesn't notice at all that his goals conflict with those of A. A does not make explicit the ends he is striving for. As long as the assumption of rational behaviour is retained, this kind of influence can only occur in case of uncertainty—taste structure of A and B assumed constant.