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Competing for Priorities in School Choice

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  • Greg Leo
  • Martin Van der Linden

Abstract

We present a model in which students can influence their priorities in a school choice mechanism through a first‐stage contest. We show that efficiency improvements at the mechanism level can lead to net efficiency losses if they come at the price of increased allocative inequalities, intensifying competition in the contest. To demonstrate this potential tension, we apply these results to the deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms ( DA $\mathrm{DA}$ and IA $\mathrm{IA}$) and show that there are conditions under which IA $\mathrm{IA}$ can yield higher net welfare than DA $\mathrm{DA}$, despite the allocative efficiency advantages of DA $\mathrm{DA}$ under these conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Greg Leo & Martin Van der Linden, 2026. "Competing for Priorities in School Choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 28(5), October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:28:y:2026:i:5:n:e70137
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70137
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