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Banking on Bias: Media Coverage and Financial Bailouts

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  • Saltuk Ozerturk

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal bailout coverage of a media firm. Driven by the incentive to lower its expected borrowing costs, the media firm's coverage tends to favor the banking sector. However, this pro‐bank bias results in the same ex ante expected borrowing cost as truthful coverage. While bias reduces borrowing costs when a bailout provides no public benefit, it also leads to higher borrowing costs when a bailout serves the public interest. Ultimately, pro‐bank media bias always harms the taxpayer's expected welfare. Moreover, greater financial fragility in the media sector increases the likelihood of bank failures that taxpayers would ideally seek to prevent.

Suggested Citation

  • Saltuk Ozerturk, 2025. "Banking on Bias: Media Coverage and Financial Bailouts," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(5), October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:5:n:e70064
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70064
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