IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v21y2019i5p847-865.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes

Author

Listed:
  • Annarita Colasante
  • Aurora García‐Gallego
  • Nikolaos Georgantzis
  • Andrea Morone
  • Tiziana Temerario

Abstract

We analyze a public good game (PGG) with intragroup competition in which, generally but not always, the dominant strategy is to not contribute; therefore, free riding is the unique Nash equilibrium, not achieving Pareto efficiency. We propose a PGG setup where subjects' contributions are rewarded with different individual returns following a rank‐order voluntary contribution mechanism. It is found that the resulting competition for a better return significantly increases contributions. This effect is sensitive to the salience of return differences rewarding higher contributions. Furthermore, the positive effect of return differences on contribution levels depends on an individual's return‐to‐risk sensitivity as elicited through an independent risk elicitation task.

Suggested Citation

  • Annarita Colasante & Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzis & Andrea Morone & Tiziana Temerario, 2019. "Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 847-865, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:5:p:847-865
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12369
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12369
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jpet.12369?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shakun D. Mago & Jennifer Pate, 2023. "Greed and fear: Competitive and charitable priming in a threshold volunteer's dilemma," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 138-161, January.
    2. Hubert János Kiss & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia & Vita Zhukova, 2023. "Group contest in a coopetitive setup: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(3), pages 463-490, July.
    3. Angela Stefania Bergantino & Sara Gil‐Gallen & Andrea Morone, 2023. "Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 39-73, March.
    4. Yansong Li & Zhenliang Liu & Yuqian Wang & Edmund Derrington & Frederic Moisan & Jean-Claude Dreher, 2023. "Spillover effects of competition outcome on future risky cooperation," Post-Print hal-04325682, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:5:p:847-865. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.