IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v20y2018i2p257-270.html

On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Gavrel
  • Thérèse Rebière

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Gavrel & Thérèse Rebière, 2018. "On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 257-270, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:2:p:257-270
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12261
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12261
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jpet.12261?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2015. "Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1281-1305, October.
    2. Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1996. "Satisfaction and comparison income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 359-381, September.
    3. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2012. "On the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1746-1758.
    4. Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger & David Schkade & Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, 2006. "Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion," Working Papers 77, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    5. Friedman, Daniel & Ostrov, Daniel N., 2008. "Conspicuous consumption dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 121-145, September.
    6. Ulph, David, 2014. "Keeping Up with the Joneses: Who Loses Out?," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-14, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    7. Ulph, David, 2014. "Keeping up with the Joneses: Who loses out?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 400-403.
    8. Ed Hopkins, 2008. "Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship?," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 6(4), pages 351-372, December.
    9. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    10. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1984. "Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 63-81.
    11. David Card & Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, 2012. "Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2981-3003, October.
    12. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-969, July.
    13. Ulph, David, 2014. "Keeping Up with the Joneses: Who Loses Out?," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-14, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. Gerard R. Butters, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 465-491.
    15. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
    16. Ireland, N. J., 2001. "Optimal income tax in the presence of status effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 193-212, August.
    17. David Ulph, 2014. "Keeping Up with the Joneses: Who Loses Out?," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201412, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    18. repec:pri:cepsud:125krueger is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2019. "One Dynamic Game for Two Veblenian Ideas. Income Redistribution is Pareto-Improving in the Presence of Social Concerns," Working Papers halshs-02083460, HAL.
    2. Frédéric Gavrel, 2016. "Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game," Working Papers halshs-01319593, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frédéric Gavrel & Thérèse Rebière, 2015. "On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths," Working Papers halshs-01242504, HAL.
    2. Felix FitzRoy & Jim Jin & Michael Nolan, 2023. "Higher tax and less work: reverse “Keep up with the Joneses” and rising inequality," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 177-190, August.
    3. Frédéric Gavrel & Thérèse Rebière, 2015. "On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Keeping Up With The Joneses," Working Papers halshs-01158406, HAL.
    4. Irakli Japaridze & Nagham Sayour, 2021. "Dying from envy: The role of inequality," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(6), pages 1374-1392, June.
    5. Frédéric Gavrel, 2019. "One Dynamic Game for Two Veblenian Ideas. Income Redistribution is Pareto-Improving in the Presence of Social Concerns," Working Papers halshs-02083460, HAL.
    6. FitzRoy, Felix & Jin, Jim & Nolan, Michael A., 2019. "Higher Tax and Less Work: An Optimal Response to Relative Income Concern," IZA Discussion Papers 12468, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Ed Hopkins, 2008. "Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship?," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 6(4), pages 351-372, December.
    8. Sámano Daniel, 2009. "Explaining Taxes at the Upper Tail of the Income Distribution: The Role of Utility Interdependence," Working Papers 2009-16, Banco de México.
    9. Tom Truyts, 2010. "Social Status In Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 137-169, February.
    10. Stavros A. Drakopoulos, 2020. "Pay Level Comparisons in Job Satisfaction Research and Mainstream Economic Methodology," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 825-842, March.
    11. Frédéric Gavrel, 2016. "Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game," Working Papers halshs-01319593, HAL.
    12. Bronnmann, Julia & Requate, Till & Steinbrunner, Philipp, 2025. "Driving desire: Exploring willingness to pay for a higher social status in automobiles," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    13. Fengqi Liu & Keqing Liu & Jianpo Xue, 2025. "Habit Formation and News-driven Business Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 56, April.
    14. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Ainura Tursunalieva, 2016. ""Keeping up with the Joneses" and fertility choice," Monash Economics Working Papers 30-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    15. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 2021. "Environmental policy when consumers value conformity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    16. Huang, Kevin X.D. & Liu, Fengqi & Meng, Qinglai & Xue, Jianpo, 2022. "Keeping up with the Joneses and the consumption response to government spending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    17. Simon P. Anderson & André de Palma, 2012. "Competition for attention in the Information (overload) Age," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(1), pages 1-25, March.
    18. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dispersion and Short Run Equilibrium in a Queuing Model," Discussion Papers 03-09, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    19. Vera Brenčič, 2012. "Wage posting: evidence from job ads," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1529-1559, November.
    20. Tomer Blumkin & Spencer Bastani & Luca Micheletto, 2024. "Rethinking Commodity Taxation: The New StatusRedistribution Channel," Working Papers 2412, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:2:p:257-270. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.