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Taxation in digital media markets

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Jarle Kind
  • Marko Koethenbuerger

Abstract

Digital media goods and digital media platforms exhibit cost structures and network effects that might imply that price and quantity effects of consumption taxes are qualitatively different compared to what we typically find for physical goods. For instance, in most European countries and U.S. states, printed newspapers and books face favorable value added taxes (VATs) or sales taxes. This has probably increased their circulation. In contrast, reducing the VAT rate on digital newspapers has the opposite effects; it increases prices and leads to lower sales. This is not true for ebooks, but a low‐tax policy is still ineffective if the aim is to reduce prices. The primary effect of exempting ebooks from VATs is to increase profits for publishers.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Jarle Kind & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2018. "Taxation in digital media markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(1), pages 22-39, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:1:p:22-39
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12257
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Armando José Garcia Pires, 2023. "Ad-Valorem Taxes, Prices and Content Diversification in the News Market," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-28, March.
    2. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "Tax Incidence of VAT Enforcement Reform for Foreign Services and Small Businesses in Two-sided Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-06, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Kuo-Feng KAO & Hiroshi MUKUNOKI, 2022. "Optimal Tariffs on a Monopoly Platform in Two-sided Markets," Discussion papers 22066, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    4. Diego d’Andria, 2023. "Effects of an ad valorem Web Tax in a Cournot-Nash market for digital advertising," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(1), pages 20-42, February.
    5. Juan Manuel Sanchez‐Cartas & Gonzalo León, 2021. "Multisided Platforms And Markets: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 452-487, April.
    6. Leonardo Madio, 2023. "Content Moderation and Advertising in Social Media Platforms," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0297, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    7. Leonardo Madio & Martin Quinn, 2024. "Content Moderation and Advertising in Social Media Platforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 11169, CESifo.
    8. Shigeo Morita & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "VAT Reform via Monopolistic Platformer in Borderless Economy: Price Pass-Though and Efficiency Consequences," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-02-Rev2., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Jul 2025.
    9. Hans Jarle Kind & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2025. "Taxation and multi-sided platforms: a review," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 32(3), pages 895-915, June.
    10. Juan Manuel Sánchez-Cartas, 2021. "Intellectual property and taxation of digital platforms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 197-221, April.
    11. Marko Köthenbürger, 2020. "Taxation of Digital Platforms," EconPol Working Paper 41, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    12. Wei Cui & Nigar Hashimzade, 2019. "The Digital Services Tax as a Tax on Location-Specific Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 7737, CESifo.
    13. Sangita Poddar & Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2024. "A theoretical analysis on two‐sided duopoly platforms and tax regimes," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 20(1), pages 88-119, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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