Capacity Investment with Dynamic Operation and Intertemporal Budget Balance
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- Daniel Danau, 2011. "Capacity Investment with Dynamic Operation and Intertemporal Budget Balance," Post-Print halshs-01114147, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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