Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements
The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices use in judging patentability defines the height of patent protection. The author studies patent height in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. A competitor who wants to invent around the other's patent is restricted by a minimum improvement level. The author shows that low patent protection does not affect market equilibrium without patent protection. A patent holder can lose with medium patent heights but not if patents provide high protection. The non patent holder can gain with medium heights but is increasingly worse off with higher patent protection. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 44 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:44:y:1996:i:2:p:151-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.