IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v41y1993i1p61-76.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Provision of Information in a Bertrand Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Ireland, Norman J

Abstract

A two-stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by positive expected profits. An alternati ve interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders wil l be made. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Ireland, Norman J, 1993. "The Provision of Information in a Bertrand Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 61-76, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:41:y:1993:i:1:p:61-76
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%28199303%2941%3A1%3C61%3ATPOIIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. AMIR, Rabah & GARCIA, Filomena & KNAUFF, Malgorzata, 2006. "Endogenous heterogeneity in strategic models: symmetry-breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavities," CORE Discussion Papers 2006008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Amir, Rabah & Garcia, Filomena & Knauff, Malgorzata, 2010. "Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1968-1986, September.
    3. Wilson, Chris M., 2010. "Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 496-506, September.
    4. Zhang, Jianqiang & Liang, Qi & Huang, Jian, 2016. "Forward advertising: A competitive analysis of new product preannouncement," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 3-12.
    5. Ireland, Norman J., 2003. "Random pricing by labor-managed firms in markets with imperfect consumer information," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 573-583, September.
    6. Roy, Santanu, 2000. "Strategic segmentation of a market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(8), pages 1279-1290, December.
    7. De Nijs, Romain, 2013. "Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 32-40.
    8. repec:kap:qmktec:v:16:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11129-017-9196-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ireland, Norman J, 2002. "Firms' Strategies For Reducing The Effectiveness Of Consumer Price Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 627, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    10. Rosa Branca Esteves, 2009. "CUSTOMER POACHING AND ADVERTISING -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 112-146, March.
    11. Rosa Branca Esteves, 2007. "Customer Poaching and Advertising," NIPE Working Papers 12/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    12. Dinlersoz, Emin M. & Yorukoglu, Mehmet, 2008. "Informative advertising by heterogeneous firms," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 168-191, June.
    13. repec:eee:iepoli:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:60-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Christou, C. & Vettas, N., 2008. "On informative advertising and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 92-112, January.
    15. Ishigaki, Hiroaki, 2000. "Informative advertising and entry deterrence: a Bertrand model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 337-343, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:41:y:1993:i:1:p:61-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.