The Provision of Information in a Bertrand Oligopoly
A two-stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by positive expected profits. An alternati ve interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders wil l be made. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 41 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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