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The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing

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  • Lin, Y Joseph

Abstract

Using the dampening-of-competition approach to understanding vertical relationships, this paper shows that, in the absence of intrabrand retailer competition, firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing. The paper explains the frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality. The results are used to analyze the famous 1949 Standard Stations case. The author concludes that the 1949 Court did the right thing for a wrong reason. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin, Y Joseph, 1990. "The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 209-223, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:2:p:209-23
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Junji & Ju, Heng, 2016. "The determinants of dealership structure: Empirical analysis of the Chinese auto market," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 961-981.
    2. Irmen, Andreas, 1998. " Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 333-359, September.
    3. repec:bla:jemstr:v:26:y:2017:i:4:p:923-954 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Markus Reisinger & Tim Paul Thomes, 2017. "Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 923-954, December.
    5. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond," Working Papers 2013-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    6. Mauleon, Ana & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2011. "Networks of manufacturers and retailers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 351-367, March.
    7. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    8. Elhauge, Einer & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2015. "Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 111-121.
    9. repec:kap:jincot:v:18:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0251-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Rafael MONER-COLONQUES & José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Amparo URBANO, 2002. "The Manufacturers’ Choice of Brand Policy under Successive Duopoly," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    11. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Joel Sandonis, 2018. "Manufacturer Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-24, March.
    12. Paolo G. Garella & Martin Peitz, 2000. "Intermediation Can Replace Certification," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, March.
    13. Nigel Driffield, 1999. "Regulation of the Petrol Industry in the UK: Issues and Evidence," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 349-365.
    14. José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2001. "Equilibrium Distribution Systems Under Retailers' Strategic Behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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