IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v39y1990i1p15-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Producer Surplus and Subsidization of Pollution Control Device: A Non-monotonic Relationship

Author

Listed:
  • Laplante, Benoit

Abstract

Regulators have been concerned with the impact of environmental regulation on the profitability of regulated firms: there have been numerous grants and subsidy programs to reduce the cost of emission control equipment. Intuitively, there should be a monotonically increasing relationship between profits and the amount of subsidization. However, the author shows that this may not be so since regulation may establish a collusive outcome amongst oligopolistic competitors. The role of the subsidization policy may then be seen as the following: given Cournot players, the regulator may subsidize the emission control device to prevent the industry from reaching a profit superior outcome. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Laplante, Benoit, 1990. "Producer Surplus and Subsidization of Pollution Control Device: A Non-monotonic Relationship," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 15-23, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:1:p:15-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%28199009%2939%3A1%3C15%3APSASOP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoît & Tanguay, Georges A., 1994. "La firme et l’environnement," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 97-111, juin.
    2. Margrethe Aanesen, 2012. "Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 145-160, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:1:p:15-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.